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The Fruits of Our Labor: Essays on
Work and Its Impacts
Natalia Emanuel
These essays explore the modern workplace and how
it impacts low-wage workers. The research focuses on the
various ways low-wage work interacts with constraints
and obligations inside and outside of work, including
the effects of wage-setting decisions on productivity and
retention among warehouse workers and customer service
representatives, reasons underpinning the gender-pay gap
among unionized bus and train operators, whether work
obligations may be at fault for failure to appear at court
dates, and why firms may be loath to offer remote work
possibilities despite their effect on worker productivity.
My work utilizes a number of different methods, including
natural experiments, randomized controlled trials, and
surveys. Each paper has leveraged data specific to the firm or
organization I study.
Together, these essays aim to understand various different
forces that are at play when firms are making key personnel
decisions—such as how much to pay and the location of
work—and when workers are optimizing, given the decisions
that firms have made.

Essay 1
The Payoffs of Higher Pay:
Elasticities of Productivity and Labor
Supply with Respect to Wages
(with Emma Harrington)
Firm wage-setting decisions must balance the benefits
to the firm of higher pay—lower turnover, higher worker
effort, and enhanced recruitment—against the direct costs of
higher compensation. This essay provides new evidence on
the returns to the firm of higher pay. We estimate elasticities
of productivity, turnover, and recruitment among warehouse
workers, and customer service employees at a Fortune 500
retailer. We leverage idiosyncrasies in the firm’s pay-setting
policies to estimate the response of productivity, turnover,
and recruitment to pay using three complementary empirical
strategies.
First, we use a large, abrupt jump in pay to look at the
difference in turnover and productivity before and after. In
one of the warehouses at the firm, the pay went from $16.20
to $18.00/hour with no warning. The firm had long been
concerned about this warehouse, but due to administrative
issues in the compensation department, it had not followed
through with adjusting pay. As such, the timing of the pay
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bump was as good as random. Moreover, no other changes
in how the warehouse was run occurred at the same time,
and accordingly we see no change in the demographic
composition of the warehouse.
Moving in step with the pay increase at the warehouse,
productivity jumps and turnover drops among the warehouse
workers. Workers initially handled about 4.9 boxes per
hour, but when their pay increased, they began handling
another 0.33 boxes per hour. This would imply that a 1
percent increase in pay is associated with about a 1 percent
increase in productivity. The increase in this productivity
is both because they are spending more of their time in the
warehouse actually moving boxes, and also because they
are moving boxes more swiftly. Likewise, turnover drops
around the pay change. Beforehand, over 13 percent of the
warehouse’s workers left each month. After the pay change,
the turnover decreased by 2.5 percentage points. A 1 percent
increase in pay in this warehouse was associated with a 3
percent decrease in turnover.1
We then consider the same two responses to pay—
productivity and turnover—among another group of
workers using a different empirical approach, finding
similar results. Nationally, the firm has sticky wages for
their customer service workers. Over time, the constant pay
leads to exogenous variation in the value of wages relative
to workers’ local outside options. By comparing changes in
relative pay in various cities over the course of the year to
the changes in the productivity and turnover in those cities,
we are able to estimate the effect of changes in relative
wages on workers’ behavior. The key assumptions are that
the wages at our firm have negligible effects on the outside
option. We are comfortable with this assumption because in
any of the studied cities, this firm hires less than 0.5 percent
of the people employed in customer service who work in
that city. Additionally, we assume that other local changes
that would affect productivity are orthogonal to changes
in the wage. Our estimate would be biased toward zero if
there were measurement error in wage growth, which would
lead to attenuation bias if wage growth caused by a local
productivity shock or inflows of more productive workers
increased productivity in high wage-growth areas.
Using the sticky-pay empirical strategy, we find that
when customer service workers receive pay that is $1 more
than their outside option, their productivity increases and
they are less likely to leave the firm, just as we had found
with the warehouse workers. Customer service workers on
average handled 25 calls per day but handled 1.9 calls, or 7.5
percent more, when paid more. So, a 1 percent increase in
pay is associated with a 1.2 percent increase in productivity.
Interestingly, this does not come at the expense of customer
satisfaction reviews: there does not appear to be a quantityquality trade-off. Rather, workers seem to spend less time
on paperwork and a few more minutes per day working.
Turnover among customer service workers decreases when
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pay is higher than the outside option. Among customer
service workers at this firm, 4.5 percent leave per month. But
where pay is higher than the local outside option, there is a
1.2 percentage point reduction in turnover. This implies that
a 1 percent increase in pay is associated with a 4.5 percent
reduction in turnover.
Recruitment also responds to pay. To estimate how, we
use the fact that the firm sets wages nationally for its remote
customer service workers. Regardless of location, the firm
offers a wage of $14/hour, which creates heterogeneity in
wages relative to the outside option. We estimate how the
pay relative to workers’ outside options relates to the number
of workers recruited, controlling for local controls, including
the local unemployment rate and the number of people
working on that occupation locally. The key assumption we
make is that the covariance of the relative wage with features
of the locality other than the pool of available workers and
unemployment rate does not also correlate with differential
recruitment. Since recruitment is done nationally and the
firm is indifferent about the location of its remote customer
service workers, we believe this to be a safe assumption. We
find that for each dollar of pay, recruitment numbers increase
by nearly 23 percent. Since we are measuring the number
of people hired, we are capturing a measure of how many
qualified candidates a dollar recruits, which is the relevant
metric for a firm.
Finally, we estimate gender-specific responses to
higher pay to understand what our model suggests about
occupation-level gender pay gaps. Male customer service
workers at our firm are almost 10 percent more likely to
leave their jobs than are women. The gender difference in
turnover is consistent with women facing smaller pools
of outside options; for example, due to less willingness
to commute. Moreover, men adjust their likelihood of
leaving the job more in response to pay than do women:
when paid a dollar more, men reduce their turnover by 40
percent. The female labor supply response is not statistically
significant. While we have no evidence about the source of
this difference, it is consistent with men doing more on-thejob-search than women. Assuming a constant production
function and that there are no other gender differences, the
difference in the labor supply responses would suggest that
for every dollar a male worker earns, a female worker would
earn $0.94.
In contrast, female customer service workers at our firm
have larger productivity responses to pay. When paid a
dollar more relative to the outside option, female customer
service workers increase the number of calls handled by
9 percent relative to the male increase of 5 percent. Given
the firm’s cost per call, the female increase in productivity
represents a savings of $1.91 per hour for a dollar increase
in wages. For male workers, the firm just breaks even.
That women increase their productivity more in the face
of higher pay than do men suggests a force that pushes in

2021 Dissertation Summaries

the opposite direction of the existing gender pay gap. The
different productivity response is consistent with a number of
potential explanations, none of which we can identify from
our administrative data,2 including women having more firmloyalty, believing that they have fewer outside options, and
believing that they face discrimination.
As a whole, this essay aims to understand the incentives
firms face when setting pay in regard to productivity,
recruitment, and turnover. However, the essay leaves many
unanswered questions about the gender pay gap. Sources of
the within-occupation gender pay gap are addressed in the
next paper in my dissertation.

Essay 2
Why Do Women Earn Less Than Men?
Evidence from Bus and Train Operators
(with Val Bolotnyy)
At the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA),
the unionized organization that runs Boston-area buses and
trains, there exists a gender pay gap: for each dollar that
the typical male employee takes home, the typical female
employee earns $0.89.
The existence of a gender pay gap in this workplace
is curious since many of the traditional explanations for
the gender pay gap are moot in this context. The unionnegotiated contract specifies pay rates and tenure-based
promotion schedules with the explicit intent of eliminating
any managerial bias in these domains. The structures of
the contract also mean that any gender-based differences
in workers’ willingness to compete or negotiate are
rendered irrelevant in this workplace. Finally, since we
are looking only at one occupation, we are not picking up
on occupational sorting, one prominent explanation for
economy-wide gender pay gaps.
In this essay we explore the roots of the gender pay gap
among unionized bus and train operators. We leverage the
fact that seniority is the sole determinant of workplace
opportunities such as overtime at the MBTA to understand
the operators’ value of time and other amenities. Conditional
on seniority, male and female operators face the same choice
sets of schedules, routes, vacation days, and overtime hours,
among other amenities. Nevertheless, the earnings gap
persists even when we condition on seniority.
Mechanically, the gender pay gap can be explained by the
fact that male operators take on 1.5 more overtime hours (83
percent) per week and take off 1.3 fewer unpaid hours off
work (49 percent) per week than their female counterparts.
This is indicative that female operators value their time
outside of work more than do male operators, consistent with
women handling more household and child care duties than
men.
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The difference in male and female overtime is driven
by overtime opportunities that arrive on short notice and
therefore demand that operators are flexible about when they
work. When overtime is scheduled the day before or the day
of the necessary shift, male operators work almost twice as
many of those hours as female operators. In contrast, when
overtime hours are scheduled three months in advance,
male operators sign up for only 7 percent more of them than
female operators.
Exacerbating the disparity in overtime acceptance rates,
male operators strategically substitute regular hours for
higher-paying overtime hours using the Family Medical
Leave Act (FMLA), a federal statute that allows workers
with a doctor’s note to take unpaid time off of work to attend
to their own medical needs or those of a family member. At
the MBTA, FMLA has been nicknamed the “Friday-Monday
Leave Act” for the way that operators have used it to avoid
undesirable shifts. Both male and female operators take
more FMLA hours when faced with undesirable shifts (e.g.,
a weekend or holiday shift). However, male operators also
work enough overtime hours in weeks with an undesirable
shift that they effectively trade off hours paid at the regular
wage for overtime hours paid at 1.5 times their wage. Female
operators also work more overtime hours in weeks with
undesirable shifts and therefore more unpaid time off, but
do not completely make up the pay lost to FMLA leave.
Together, the last-minute overtime and the usage of FMLA
mechanically account for the pay gap.
We explore how family arrangements relate to the
differences in propensity to accept overtime. The gap
between the acceptance of overtime opportunities of
male and female operators is larger if the operators have
dependents (6.8 percentage points) than if they do not (5.7
percentage points). Male acceptance rates, meanwhile, are
similar for the two groups (38.2 percent for male opera- tors
with dependents, 41.1 percent for male operators without
dependents). Though dependents generate this wedge in
acceptance rates among married and unmarried operators, the
wedge is largest among married operators. Married men with
dependents accept overtime opportunities 27.1 percent of
the time, while married women with dependents accept them
19.6 percent of the time. For unmarried men with dependents
the acceptance rate is 40.3 percent, compared to 33.6 percent
for unmarried women with dependents. These results are
consistent with male operators doing more child care through
their pocketbooks, and with female operators doing more
child care through time spent outside of work. Differences in
caretaking approaches and responsibilities thus appear to be
a significant reason why female operators work less overtime
than male operators.
We next seek to understand more about male and
female scheduling preferences, focusing on scheduling
conventionality and controllability. While both male and
female operators avoid unconventional shifts, female
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operators do so more. The most senior operators, who
pick their schedules first, have much lower incidence of
unconventional shifts—weekend shifts, shifts on holidays,
and shifts split into two blocks (“split shifts”)—relative to
operators who choose their schedules later. While 95 percent
of the least senior operators get stuck with a weekend shift
on their schedules, only 28 percent (female operators) to 35
percent (male operators) of the most senior operators do. The
same pattern holds true for holiday shifts and split shifts.
While all operators avoid unconventional schedules, female
operators avoid them more readily. Female operators are on
average about 2.5 percentage points less likely to select a
weekend shift than are male operators.
Female operators value time outside of work and schedule
controllability more than do male operators, especially when
they have dependents. Female operators with dependents are
considerably less likely than male operators with dependents
to accept an overtime opportunity. When it comes to
overtime hours worked, unmarried female operators with
dependents work only 6 percent fewer of them when they
are preplanned three months in advance, but about 60
percent fewer of them when they are offered on short notice.
Unmarried women with dependents also take the largest
amount of unpaid time off with FMLA, making them the
lowest earners in our setting.
Lastly, we study the impact of two policy changes at
the MBTA, each of which made it harder for operators to
swap regular hours for overtime hours. The first policy
change made it more difficult for operators to obtain FMLA
certification, to use FMLA for anything other than a medical
issue, and to take unpaid time off at a moment’s notice. The
second policy change, a year later, redefined overtime hours
from any hours worked in excess of 8 in a given day to any
hours worked in excess of 40 in a given week.
These policies simultaneously reduced the gender
earnings gap and hurt workers. The gender earnings
gap shrank from 12 percent before the FMLA policy
change to 9 percent between the first and second policies’
implementation and to 6 percent following the second
policy’s arrival. Yet, in addition to reducing the gap, these
policies also reduced schedule controllability. Those who
took more unpaid time off via FMLA before the policy
changes now took more unexcused leave instead, indicating
that these operators still desired control over their schedules.
Operators began procuring this control at a higher cost, since
unexcused leave can result in suspensions and discharge
from work (unlike FMLA leave). Because female workers
have greater revealed preference for schedule controllability,
these policies—particularly the first—affected female
operators more negatively than they did male operators.
Our results suggest two potentially Pareto-improving
strategies that could be implemented in this and similar
settings. First, if operators are allowed to exchange or
transfer shifts, unexpected absenteeism could be reduced.
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Reducing absenteeism would decrease both unpaid time off
and resultant last-minute overtime opportunities, both of
which fuel the earnings gap. Service provision would also
improve if absenteeism drops and operator productivity
consequently increases. Second, expanding the number
of operators whose job is specifically to cover for others’
absences would also likely decrease the earnings disparity,
overtime expenses, and inconsistent service.
This paper uses the unique setting of unionized bus
and train operators to explore how seemingly neutral firm
policies can result in unequal outcomes. While the essay
focuses on this singular occupation, the lessons learned are
broadly applicable. Many occupations have last-minute
scheduling—whether it is the server at JambaJuice, which
assigns shifts based on the upcoming weather, or the lawyer
who is asked to do a dinner tomorrow night with a client. In
these occupations, employees who have obligations outside
the workforce may have to forego valuable opportunities in
the same way as bus and train operators. Similarly, many
occupations have relatively little flexibility, prompting
workers to try to inject flexibility into their schedules in ways
that can be quite costly to them. Since many of the features
that prompt the pay gap among bus and train operators show
up in other occupations as well, this paper highlights specific
sources of the gender pay gap that may be generalizable
outside this particular setting.

Essay 3
Behavioral Biases and Legal Compliance
(with Helen Ho)
When considering attendance at court hearings, traffic,
municipal, and misdemeanor courts have a problem: as many
as 40 percent of defendants fail to appear (FTA). FTAs are
costly for the court since it leads to unused personnel time.
Statutorily, they are also costly to defendants: they can result
in warrants for the defendant’s arrest, fines, and fees.
Court officials as well as defendants who did show up
believed that work makes attending a court date particularly
challenging. Work obligations can make spending four
hours in court plus travel time quite costly. Nevertheless,
if the hearing occurs while the defendant is not working,
the inability to bring children into the courtroom may be
a challenge. If they are charged with a large fine or fee,
liquidity constraints may make attendance unattractive.
To address these time and resource constraints, courts
offer some accommodations, including rescheduling and
payment plan options. However, accessing these court
accommodations is notoriously difficult to people who
don’t know, for example, that they must file a request for
a “one-time continuance” if they seek to reschedule. It is
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also possible, however, that defendants are forgetful or
disorganized and simply need the arraignment brought to
their attention.
To understand the potential causes of an FTA and
examine low-cost, scalable ways to address the problem, we
collaborated with a large court system to run a randomized
controlled trial (RCT). In this trial, we provided defendants
with no additional information (the treatment arm),
with informational nudge reminders that helped remind
defendants about the arraignment and possible court
accommodations, or with informational nudges alongside the
offer of personalized assistance.
If constraints such as work and child care obligations
prevent attendance at court, we would expect that the
defendants randomized to receive either informational
nudges or personalized assistance would have greater
uptake of court accommodations and greater attendance at
their arraignments as well. If difficulty navigating the court
system were part of the cause, then we would expect to see
additional boosts in usage of court accommodations and
reductions in FTA rates.
In our RCT, we found that personalized assistance
increased uptake of court accommodations such as
rescheduling and payment plans. However, both
informational nudges and personalized assistance were
equally effective in reducing FTA rates, taking them from a
baseline of 21 percent FTA down by 39 percent. Moreover,
there was no difference between the two arms in terms of the
amount paid out by the defendants.

Essay 4
“Working” Remotely? Selection, Treatment,
and the Market for Remote Work
(with Emma Harrington)
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, only 6 percent of
U.S. jobs were remote. This is curious be- cause many
jobs are “remoteable,” many workers report wanting to
work remotely, and prior studies suggest there is a positive
treatment effect of working remotely. During the COVID19 pandemic, as many as 45 percent of workers reported
they would like to remain remote even after the pandemic.
Mas and Pallais (2017) found that call-center workers
were willing to accept 8 percent lower wages in order to be
remote. Moreover, Bloom et al. (2015) found remote work
actually increased productivity. Nevertheless, even at what
appears to be the tail end of the pandemic, only 9 percent of
job postings are for fully remote positions.
The puzzle thus arises: Why is there so little remote work
despite the fact that such a work setup seems to enhance
worker happiness and productivity? In this essay, the final
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paper completed during my PhD,3 we argue that adverse
selection is at fault. Worse workers are inclined to accept
remote jobs, thereby raising the cost of remote positions
to the firm. To map the dynamics around remote work, we
leverage data from customer service representatives at a
Fortune 500 retail firm.
We develop a model that ties promotion penalties to the
selection of workers who choose remote jobs. In the model,
remote work reduces the probability that firms learn about
workers’ abilities. Latently low-ability workers consequently
sort into remote jobs to hide their ability while latently
high-ability workers sort into on-site jobs to reveal their
high ability. The resulting adverse selection into remote
work raises its average cost above its marginal cost, causing
remote work to be underprovided.
This model fits several indicators of informational
frictions present in the firm. Managers appear to be less
certain about remote workers’ productivity: managers’
evaluations are less predictive of the future performance of
remote workers than on-site workers. Accordingly, workers
at the retailer who chose remote jobs had about half of the
promotion chances as those who chose on-site jobs. This
is consistent with Bloom et al.’s (2015) finding that remote
work negatively impacts promotion.
We test the model’s predictions empirically, analyzing
productivity differences between workers who are hired into
comparable remote and on-site jobs. We use the number of
calls the call-center worker handles as the primary metric of
productivity, but check also that there is no quantity-quality
trade-off by measuring customer satisfaction ratings. Two
natural experiments at the retailer allow us to separately
identify the treatment and selection effects of remote work.
First, the retailer introduced a program in 2018 that
allowed on-site workers to apply to remote call-center jobs.
The initiative changed new hires’ offers. Considering the
group of people who ultimately ended up working remotely,
we compare the productivity of those who thought that
they would likely always work on-site to those who were
offered a job where they knew they would go remote. This
comparison captures the selection effect of offering remote
work. To estimate the treatment effect of remote work, we
can look at the productivity of those workers who started
on-site and also worked remotely. For workers who thought
that they would always work on-site and were surprised by
the opportunity to go remote, this comparison represents
only the treatment effect.
Second, COVID-19 caused all of the call-center workers
to work remotely. Starting on April 6, 2020, all on-site callcenter workers were sent to work from home. Comparing
these workers’ productivity captures both the treatment
effect of remote work as well as the effects of COVID-19.
However, since July 2018 the retailer has hired workers
directly into remote call-center jobs, creating a control
group. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we can
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cancel out the common shocks of COVID-19 on worker
productivity. Moreover, by comparing the prepandemic
productivity of those who were initially on-site to those
who were initially remote, we capture the selection effect of
remote work.
These two natural experiments give relatively similar
estimates of the treatment and selection effects of remote
work. In the first, we estimate that being offered remote work
reduces productivity by 21 percent. The selection effect as
measured in the second natural experiment estimates an 18
percent reduction in productivity. In neither setting does the
decreased number of calls handled mean that the remote
call-center workers are compensating by achieving higher
customer satisfaction. The treatment effect estimated in
the first natural experiment marks a 7 percent increase in
productivity on account of remote work. The increase in calls
handled arises from them answering queries 3 percent faster
and spending 4.5 percent more time on the phone rather than
waiting, filing paperwork, and performing other adjacent
tasks. The treatment effect as measured in the second natural
experiment represents a 10 percent increase in productivity.
Again, these increases in the calls handled do not come at the
expense of customer satisfaction. Together, the two natural
experiments provide evidence of a positive treatment effect,
but a negative selection effect of remote work.
Finally, we quantify the distortion arising from the
adverse selection that we document. We estimate workers’
demand for remote work using the retailer’s policy of
paying all remote workers the same wage nationally. By
paying all workers $14/hour, regardless of location, the
firm creates variation in the opportunity cost of taking the
remote job because workers’ local on-site alternative jobs
vary in their wages. Using the estimated demand curve,
we find that adverse selection likely reduces the share of
call-center workers working remotely from 17 percent to 6
percent nationally, leading to losses of $824 million annually
just among the 3.2 million American call-center workers.
Relative to other occupations, call-center jobs tend not to
have tremendous promotion ladders; at our retailer, there are
only two major promotion levels. Call-center work is also
relatively easy to monitor from afar. As such, the losses may
be even more substantial in other occupations where career
concerns are more acute and where it is more challenging to
monitor workers’ productivity if they are not on-site.
Our analysis suggests that the pandemic will attenuate
but not eliminate adverse selection into remote work. On the
worker side, surveys suggest that the retailer’s workers have
learned more about their tastes during the lockdown, causing
more high-ability workers to choose remote jobs. This
reduction in the average cost of remote work would increase
its prevalence by 1.1 percentage point. On the firm side, we
find little evidence that the retailer’s experience with remote
work reduced the promotion penalty and the consequent
incentive for workers to sort on ability.
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Having leveraged data from call-center workers, a
highly “remoteable” job, our paper unfortunately cannot
speak to tasks that require much coordination or intense
concentration. For jobs requiring such tasks, prior studies
have found less benefit of remote work. As such, provision
of remote work for these jobs could arise from both the
treatment and selection effects.

Conclusion
Together, the essays completed in my doctoral studies
address several issues of work for low-wage workers,
including how firms set wages, the various forces
undergirding the gender pay gap, how work obligations may
impact legal obligations like attending a court arraignment,
and why remote work appears to be underprovisioned in the
marketplace. The essays use a range of tools—from natural
experiments to surveys and RCTs—to address the pressing
issues for low-wage workers at the moment.
Notes
1. I have noted the results of an analysis looking at an interrupted
time series. But the results are robust to considering a
difference-in-differences approach, using the firm’s other
warehouses as the control group.
2. The partner firm was unwilling to let us run a survey on this
topic.
3. This paper was completed during my PhD, under the
advisement of my dissertation committee. It was not included
in the dissertation submitted to Harvard because I delivered my
baby prematurely and did not have time to format it according
to the university’s specifications before the submission
deadline.
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